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 
Abstract— The electricity industry is now at the verge of a 
new era. An era that promises, through the evolution of the 
existing electrical grids to Smart Grids, more efficient and 
effective power management, better reliability, reduced 
production costs and more environmentally friendly energy 
generation. Numerous initiatives across the globe, led by both 
industry and academia, reflect the mounting interest around 
the enormous benefits but also the great risks introduced by 
this evolution. This paper focuses on issues related to the 
security of the Smart Grid and the Smart Home, which we 
present as an integral part of the Smart Grid. Based on several 
scenarios we aim to present some of the most representative 
threats to the Smart Home / Smart Grid environment. The 
threats detected are categorized according to specific security 
goals set for the Smart Home/Smart Grid environment and 
their impact on the overall system security is evaluated. A 
review of contemporary literature is then conducted with the 
aim of presenting promising security countermeasures with 
respect to the identified specific security goals for each 
presented scenario. An effort to shed light on open issues and 
future research directions concludes the paper. 
 
Index Terms— Smart Grids, Smart Homes, Security, 
Countermeasures, Challenges 
 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The electric power infrastructure as we know it today has 
managed to serve our needs successfully, almost unchanged, 
for nearly a century; revolutionizing almost every aspect of 
our lives. However, as this infrastructure is inevitably aging 
it becomes increasingly less efficient, repeatedly running up 
against its limitations and constantly straining to keep up 
with our ever-increasing requirements. Needs for reliability, 
scalability, manageability, environmentally friendly energy 
generation, interoperability and cost effectiveness, bring 
forward the necessity for a modernized and intelligent grid 
for tomorrow; a new, reliable, efficient, flexible and secure 
energy infrastructure, known as the Smart Grid [1]. 
Through the incorporation of advanced power system 
electronics, networking and communication technologies the 
Smart Grid is envisioned to significantly enhance the 
existing electric grid.  Allowing for more accurate real-time 
monitoring, ensuring the optimization of power flows and 
enabling for two-way communication between the utility and 
customer sides while pointing the way to a more 
environmentally friendly energy generation via the 
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incorporation of renewable energy sources into the grid (both 
at the utility and the consumer sides) [2][3].  
An indispensable part of this evolution, residential smart 
metering, brings the Smart Grid into our homes, 
transforming them into the Smart Homes of the future and 
allowing for more effective household energy monitoring 
and control.   
Recent studies suggest that 40% of total energy 
consumption and 36% of total carbon dioxide emissions in 
the European Union can be attributed to homes and buildings 
[4]. The corresponding rates in the U.S and China range at 
similar levels making the need for home evolution 
imperative. The households of the future, need not only be 
significantly smarter but also more energy aware. We will 
refer to these, as energy aware Smart Homes;  i.e. homes that 
leverage sensor and networking technologies to ensure 
communication amongst their appliances and a smart meter 
that constantly reports recorded energy consumption to the 
grid, whilst also allowing the Smart Grid to push 
information, such as dynamic pricing, back to the house. 
Such homes are expected to dynamically adjust their energy 
profile according to Smart Grid capabilities, while also 
providing their owners with the opportunity for remote 
device monitoring [5]. 
Smart Grid’s success heavily relies upon communication. 
Every single entity part of this complex, heterogeneous 
network has to be able to communicate with any other entity 
in it and in the Smart Home, at any time, in an efficient but 
also secure manner. With this communication being greatly 
reliant on information technology though, concerns 
regarding security and privacy aspects inevitably creep in. 
Vulnerabilities inherent to communication and networking 
systems can clearly affect the Smart Grid, with consequences 
often more severe than what we are accustomed to face in 
ordinary information systems. In fact, if exploited 
successfully these vulnerabilities can severely harm the 
entire infrastructure, causing economies to collapse, societies 
to fall apart and people to lose their lives. Security thus 
becomes a primary concern for this critical infrastructure. 
Despite its criticality however, the research on Smart 
Home and Smart Grid security issues is still in its early 
stages [6]. As a result, we are motivated to further 
investigate them. Our aim is to contribute to the already 
existing literature by providing a more comprehensive view 
of security in the Smart Grid environment, taking into 
account its persistent interaction with the Smart Home and 
focusing on the entire network, not only some specific 
subsystems which are often the focus of current security 
related literature. For this reason, our adopted approach 
involves the identification of threats that can arise, under 
some of the most typical scenarios of interaction between 
various entities of the Smart Grid environment, from 
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customer side to utility side and vice versa. Our approach 
can be summarized in three key points. 
  Firstly, there is the identification of the main 
scenarios of interaction between entities in Smart 
Home and Smart Grid environments. The 
classification of the risks that threaten these 
interactions and an evaluation of their impact on 
overall system security.   Secondly, a review of current literature concerning 
security countermeasures that could potentially 
defend us against the detected threats is carried out. 
It presents promising security countermeasures with 
respect to the identified specific security goals for 
each presented interaction scenario.  And thirdly, open issues are presented and future 
directions for research are proposed. 
 
     
To the best of our knowledge, this is the first survey 
concerning Smart Grid cyber security issues that places such 
a strong emphasis on the Smart Home environment and its 
interaction with the Smart Grid environment. The reason for 
this focus lies in the recognition that with the dawn of the 
Smart Grid the role of the consumer and his Smart Home 
becomes of increasing importance to the Grid. Of course, the 
bulk transmission system at the utility side is still considered 
to be the primary focus of cyber security efforts. However, in 
the Smart Grid era the protection of network connections to 
the customers’ homes becomes vital as it can also jeopardize 
the Grid’s robustness and stability. 
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. In 
Section II, we briefly introduce the architectures of the Smart 
Grid and the Smart Home, underlining the benefits of their 
interactions. In Section III, we present the security goals that 
are expected to be met and identify threats that occur under 
representative scenarios of interaction between Smart 
Home/Smart Grid entities. The impact of these threats is also 
evaluated in this section. In Section IV, we review 
contemporary literature to discuss promising 
countermeasures against the different attacks identified in 
section III. Section V, provides an overview of ongoing 
standardisation efforts in the industry regarding Smart Grid 
Cyber Security. In Section VI, future research directions are 
proposed. Section VII, concludes our paper. 
 
 
II. SMART GRID & SMART HOME OVERVIEW 
A. Smart Grid Architecture 
   To date, various frameworks describing the architecture 
of the Smart Grid have been proposed by both industry and 
academia with the most widely adopted and adapted model 
by far, being the reference model proposed by the U.S 
National Institute of Standards and Technology (NIST) 
[3].This model conceptualizes the Smart Grid as a set of 
seven interconnected domains. The first four domains (Bulk 
Generation, Transmission, Distribution and Customers) are 
responsible for the generation, transmission and distribution 
of energy but also for ensuring the two way communication 
between the customer side and the Advanced Metering 
Infrastructure (AMI) utility head end. The remaining three 
entities (Markets, Operations and Service Providers) are 
responsible for energy market management, energy 
distribution management and service provision.  
 
  
    
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
A slightly different architecture, merely  inspired by NIST’s 
conceptual model as described above, but also by [7][8] and 
[9], is adopted for the purposes of this study. This 
architecture conceptualizes the Smart Grid following a multi-
layered approach. As shown in Fig.1, at the bottom layer of 
this model, one can find Home Area Networks (HANs), 
Building Area Networks (BANs) and Industrial Area 
Networks (IANs) i.e. wired or wireless networks in customer 
premises (homes, buildings or industrial areas) that 
interconnect appliances with smart meters and energy 
management devices, responsible for reporting the premise’s 
consumption to the grid at any given time while also 
carrying messages from the grid back to the premise [10]. 
At the middle layer, one can find Neighborhood Area 
Networks (NANs) i.e. networks that cover small geographic 
areas, responsible for the interconnection of the smart meters 
of different kinds of premises with a distribution access point 
that aggregates the data collected by them forwarding them 
to the upper layer. Remote Terminal Units (RTUs) i.e. 
electronic devices responsible for the transmission of 
telemetry data to the SCADA system (at the top layer) and 
Phasor Measurement Units (PMUs) i.e. synchronized 
devices that measure electrical waves on the grid, are also 
considered to be part of the NAN [11]. At the top layer of 
this conceptual model, one can find Wide Area Networks 
(WANs) interconnecting multiple NANs. All the data 
collected by NANs (be it information that describes the 
grid’s  current  state  or  the  aggregate  consumption  of  a 
neighborhood or any other kind of information) is delivered 
at this top layer. The Utility’s  head  end,  the  Supervisory 
Control and Data Acquisition System (SCADA) responsible 
for the acquisition, processing, presentation and management 
of the data received, the Meter Data Management Systems 
(MDMS) responsible for billing customers according to their  
Fig. 1 A multi-layered conceptual model of the Smart Grid’s architecture. 
Smart Homes at the lower layer are in continuous two-way communication 
with the AMI-Head End at the top layer, via the AMI-network entities of the 
second layer. A more detailed view of a Smart Home’s internal environment 
and the way it interfaces to the external environment, illustrated here as the 
middle and top layers, is given in Fig.2 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
consumption, the Demand Response Management Systems 
(DRMS) and the Load Management Systems (LMS), the 
Outage Management Systems (OMS) and the Customer 
Information Systems (CIS), can all be found at this layer [3]. 
In addition, bulk generation, distributed generation, 
transmission networks, distribution networks, energy 
markets and service providers are also considered part of this 
upper layer. 
 
B. Smart Home Architecture 
   The Energy Aware Smart Home is expected to be in 
constant interaction with its internal and external 
environments. The external environment of a Smart Home 
consists of all the entities belonging to the Smart Grid and 
the single entity responsible for the interconnection of the  
Smart Home with the Smart Grid. The internal environment 
on the other hand, consists of all appliances and devices 
belonging to the Smart Home, which are centrally managed 
by an entity in it. Both the internal and external 
environments are represented by specific entities within the 
Smart Home network [12]. An entity known as the Energy 
Services  Interface  (ESI)  represents  the  “external 
environment”  whereas  an  entity  known  as  the  Energy 
Management  System  (EMS)  represents  the  “internal 
environment”. The ESI (Fig.2) is the interface between the 
Smart Home and the Smart Grid. It enables the remote 
control of devices, the support of Demand Response 
programs, the monitoring of Distributed Energy Resources 
such as wind turbines belonging to premises, the forwarding 
of consumption data to the neighborhood collection points (if 
it acts as a meter), Plug in Electric Vehicles/ Plug in Electric 
Hybrid Vehicles (PEV/PHEV) charging etc. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Despite their logical separation the ESI and Smart Meter 
functionalities can be integrated in one physical device due 
to cost considerations.  The EMS (Fig.2), on the contrary, is 
the system that enables the management of various 
appliances and systems within the Smart Home, so as to help 
the  Smart  Home  adapt  its  energy  profile  to  suit  the  grid’s 
capabilities. Of special interest to us, are the appliances 
controlled by the EMS that are part of the category of Large 
Controlled Loads [13] such as washing machines and air-
conditioning systems whose operation significantly burdens 
the grid, but can be postponed to a later time when the grid’s 
resources are less constrained. Also controlled by the EMS 
are thermostats, light switches, pool pumps and PEVs. 
  Figure 2 illustrates the ESI and EMS along with the entities 
connected to them. The green dashed-dotted lines represent 
the entities connected to the ESI whereas the red-dotted lines 
represent the entities connected to the EMS. The blue dashed 
line represents the communication between the Smart Home 
and its external environment. 
  The ESI and EMS are in continuous two way 
communication ensuring that the internal environment is 
acting in accordance  with  the  external  environment’s 
requirements and capabilities.  
 
C. Benefits arising from Smart Home – Smart Grid 
interaction 
   As illustrated in Fig.2 (blue dashed lines) the Smart Home 
can communicate with its external environment in two ways. 
Either through the Smart Meter or through the ESI. In the 
former case the Smart Meter communicates with the NAN 
aggregator to report household consumption. In the latter, the 
ESI is responsible to enable various other interactions 
between the Smart Home and the Utility such as remote load 
Fig2. An overview of a Smart Home’s architecture, internal and external environments. 
control. Through the EMS, Web Services are made available 
to the Smart Home, enabling among other things the remote 
configuration of HAN devices.  
   The integration of the Energy Aware Smart Home to the 
Smart Grid assuredly leads towards the successful meeting 
of some of the Smart Grid’s major goals. Some of the most 
illustrative benefits resulting from this interaction are: 
demand response programs; load shedding programs; 
effective feedback; peak shaving capabilities; and energy 
exchanges. 
 
1) Demand Response Programs 
   A Demand Response Program is essentially an agreement 
between the utility and its customers, promising the customer 
reduced tariffs or discounts in the end-of-month electricity 
bill, provided that he agrees to reduce his electricity 
consumption in response to signals received by the grid. The 
underlying concept is that when all customers each conserve 
a little, there will be enough power for everyone [14]. Today, 
there exists a plethora of different Demand Response 
programs, each of which has its own policies in terms of 
rewards, penalties, consumer notification policies (eg. day-
ahead, day-of ) and consumer cooperation bases (voluntary 
/mandatory). Whatever their specific characteristics 
however, the benefits of these programs, are still the same in 
principle and include a better matching of supply and 
demand that leads to a more reliable grid operation. 
 
2) Load Shedding Programs 
As in [15], Load Shedding is the terminology we use to 
describe the intentionally engineered switching off of 
electrical supply to parts of an electricity grid that happens 
under emergency situations as a last resort to protect the grid 
from suffering permanent damage. Emergency situations that 
could trigger Load Shedding regimes mostly include 
shortfalls in supply that require an immediate drop in 
demand before the demand-supply imbalance jeopardizes the 
stability of the grid. 
   Load Shedding usually happens in two ways, either 
automatically or selectively [16]. Automatic load shedding 
usually occurs as a result of concurrent failures of vital 
elements in the electrical grid and aims at isolating the part 
of the grid that faces the failure from the rest of the grid, to 
avoid a cascading event. Selective load shedding on the other 
hand, occurs when time is available to make selective 
choices on which customers can be shed. In such cases, 
priorities assigned to different feeders along the grid help 
minimize the impact of load shedding. Usually areas that 
have a residential, commercial or industrial customer mix 
and no specific critical infrastructures, are assigned a lower 
priority whereas feeders that supply infrastructures of critical 
importance such as hospitals, airports, sewerage and water 
pumping stations are assigned higher priorities. Higher 
priority areas are always the last to be affected and the first 
to regain power supply for apparent reasons. 
 
3) More effective feedback 
   According to [17], “The  effectiveness  of  feedback  on 
energy  consumption”,  a  substantial  percentage  of  domestic 
energy wastage of every household can be attributed to the 
lack of proper feedback. Through this survey it becomes 
apparent that the reason why consumers cannot actively 
participate in the effort for energy conservation lies in the 
fact that they only have a vague idea of the amounts of 
energy they are using for different purposes in their daily 
lives. As the author’s study suggests effective feedback can 
change this as it can render energy more visible and 
therefore easier to manage and control. However, not all 
sorts of feedback are considered effective. As Kempton et.al. 
mention in [18] the end-of-month bill is such an example. 
Although it mentions our overall consumption and how 
much we are charged for it, it seems that the electricity bill 
alone cannot help us conserve energy, because it does not 
reveal where the majority of energy was spent. On the other 
hand, “Social Electricity” [19] a Facebook energy-awareness 
through-social-comparisons application which allows 
electricity footprint (provided through bimonthly electricity 
bills) comparisons with friends / neighborhood / town / 
country was shown to have been beneficial in reducing 
electricity consumption, with suggestions of much greater 
reduction if real time information were available. 
   Undoubtedly, the constant interaction between the Smart 
Grid and our Energy Aware Smart Home, will allow for a 
more effective feedback. Pricing signals indicating the 
electricity tariff at any given time will arrive at our homes, 
allowing our devices to inform us instantly about the amount 
of energy (in terms of money) that will be spent if a certain 
device gets switched on at a specific moment. Such detailed 
view of energy consumption is expected to give the 
consumer a better understanding of his energy usage patterns 
and the impact his decisions have on his end-of-month 
electricity bill, thus helping him make better informed 
decisions that will benefit not only his pocket but also the 
grid. 
 
4) Peak Shaving Capabilities 
  An equally valuable benefit that the Smart Home and Smart 
Grid interaction has to offer is the introduction of dynamic 
pricing schemes that enable charging energy according to the 
time of use and current demand. Such schemes allow 
customers to benefit from lower rates when using energy 
during off-peak hours and result in a better distribution of 
demand due to shifting part of it from peak to non-peak 
hours, a process known as peak shaving [20]. 
 
5) “Energy exchanges” 
Yet another benefit resulting from the two way 
communication between the Smart Home and the Smart Grid 
is the fact that the Smart Grid consumer has the option to 
become an energy producer too. By installing distributed 
energy resources at his premises, the customer can generate, 
store and sell energy back to the Grid. Such a prospect, 
promises to open up the energy market allowing for “energy 
exchanges” to be created, where energy will be bought and 
sold in prices governed by the forces of supply and demand 
[21]. 
III. SECURITY ISSUES IN THE SMART HOME AND 
THE SMART GRID 
Having just exposed some of the most vital benefits arising 
from the interaction of Smart Home and Smart Grid entities, 
we can now further appreciate the importance of 
communication amongst the entities of this critical 
infrastructure. What we should notice however, is that as the 
connectivity amongst the different entities of the Smart Grid 
and/or the Smart Home increases, the challenges also 
increase; especially those challenges relative to system 
security.  Thanks to its critical nature, the Smart Grid can 
easily become a prime target for terrorists, hackers and 
vandals aiming to cause anything from a simple discomfort 
to havoc. Therefore, it is imperative that we start focusing on 
ways to safeguard its reliable operation and fulfill its security 
goals.   
 
A. Smart Home/Smart Grid security objectives 
 
Clearly describing the security goals the Smart Home/Smart 
Grid environment is expected to meet, serves as our first step 
in the effort for ensuring unfailing and consistent Smart Grid 
operation. For the purposes of this paper, we consider the six 
commonly adopted goals described below [13] [22-23] as the 
most important for Smart Home/Smart Grid security. These 
goals are:  
 
Confidentiality:  the assurance that data will be disclosed 
only to authorized individuals or systems. 
 
Integrity:  the assurance that the accuracy and consistency 
of data will be maintained. No unauthorized modifications, 
destruction or losses of data will go undetected.  
 
Availability:  the assurance that any network resource (data/ 
bandwidth/equipment) will always be available for any 
authorized entity. Such resources are also protected against 
any incident that threatens their availability. 
 
Authenticity:  the validation that communicating parties are 
who they claim they are, and that messages supposedly sent 
by them are indeed sent by them. 
 
Authorization:  the assurance that the access rights of every 
entity in the system are defined for the purposes of access 
control 
. 
Non repudiation:  the assurance that undeniable proof will 
exist to verify the truthfulness of any claim of an entity. 
 
B. Security Attacks 
 
   Security threats within the Smart Home/Smart Grid 
environment usually attempt to compromise one or more of 
the security goals we just described. These threats can be 
classified into two broad categories.   
   In the first  category,  namely  “passive  attacks”,  we  place 
attacks attempting to learn or make use of information from 
the system without affecting system resources. In other 
words, in passive attacks the adversary intends to obtain 
information being transmitted not to modify it but to learn 
something from it. Passive attacks can take the form of 
eavesdropping or traffic analysis. By eavesdropping we refer 
to the unauthorized interception of an on-going 
communication without the consent of the communicating 
parties. By traffic analysis we refer to something subtler. 
Instead of trying to get hold of message contents, like in an 
eavesdropping attack, in traffic analysis the adversary 
monitors traffic patterns in order to deduce useful 
information from them. Both of these attacks are considered 
difficult to detect since they do not alter data. Thus, in 
dealing with them our focus is on prevention rather than 
detection.  
   The  second  category,  namely  “active  attacks”,  is  the 
category where we place those attacks attempting to alter 
system resources or affect its operation. Active attacks can 
involve some modification to data or the introduction of 
fraudulent data into the system. The most common amongst 
these attacks are masquerading, replay, message 
modification, denial of service and malicious software. A 
masquerading attack takes place when an intruder pretends 
to be a legitimate entity to gain privileges. A replay attack 
involves the passive capture of messages in a communication 
and their retransmission to produce an unauthorized effect.  
A message modification attack, involves the alteration of the 
contents of a legitimate message or the delaying or 
reordering of a stream of messages, aiming to produce an 
unauthorized effect. A denial of service attack aims to either 
temporarily or permanently interrupt or suspend the 
availability of the communication resources of a system. 
Finally, malicious software attacks, are attacks aiming to 
exploit internal vulnerabilities to modify, destroy and steal 
information or gain unauthorized access to system resources.  
  All the above mentioned threats and many more 
subcategories of these will be identified for the Smart 
Home/Smart Grid environment in the sections to follow. The 
security requirements they violate as well as an impact 
evaluation will also be presented.  
 
C. Impact evaluation 
 
For the assessment of the criticality and sensitivity of certain 
interactions and the evaluation of the impact level of threats 
against those interactions within the Smart Home/Smart Grid 
environment, we adopt FIPS 199, impact level assessment 
criteria [24]. FIPS199 characterizes potential impact of 
threats as Low, Moderate or High. Where the potential 
impact is said to be: 
 
Low (L), if the violation of one or more of the security goals 
described above can be expected to have a limited adverse 
effect  on  Smart  Home’s/Smart  Grid’s  operations,  assets  or 
individuals. Limited adverse effect could mean degradation 
of  an  entity’s  capability  to  efficiently  perform  its  primary 
functions, minor damage to assets, minor financial losses or 
minor harm to individuals.   
 
Moderate (M), if the violation of one or more of the security 
goals described above can be expected to have a significant 
adverse  effect  on  Smart  Home’s/Smart  Grid’s  operations, 
assets or individuals. Significant adverse effect could mean 
significant degradation of an entity’s capability to efficiently 
perform its primary functions, significant damage to assets, 
significant financial losses or significant harm to individuals 
(not including loss of life or life threatening injuries). 
 
High (H), if the violation of one or more of the security 
goals described above can be expected to have a severe or 
catastrophic adverse  effect  on Smart Home’s/Smart Grid’s 
operations, assets or individuals. Severe or catastrophic 
adverse effect could mean severe degradation or loss of an 
entity’s  capability  to  perform  its  primary  functions,  major 
damage to assets, major financial losses or severe harm to 
individuals (that could even result in loss of life or life 
threatening injuries). 
 
D. Smart Home Security Issues 
 
Describing the Smart Home in section II we made a 
conceptual separation between its internal and external 
environments. The EMS was presented as the main entity of 
the internal environment on which appliances, DERs and 
PEVs get connected to,  report their consumption and receive 
on/off signals. The ESI was also presented as the entity that 
links the Smart Home with its external environment. Various 
interactions amongst Smart Home entities could become 
targets for a cyber or physical attack by an adversary or even 
by a mischievous customer. Below we introduce some of the 
most basic scenarios of interaction between entities within 
the Smart Home and discuss potential threats and their 
possible consequences. The scenarios are numbered using 
the notation SH_number. Each scenario refers to the 
interaction of entities within Smart Home followed by 
scenario’s  serial  number. Table I provides a more concise 
view of the threats presented in each scenario of this section, 
the security goals violated and an impact evaluation. The 
attacks identified for each scenario are classified as derived 
from the networking domain (N) or derived by a Smart 
Home-introduced concept (SH).    
 
1) SH_1 : Attacks threatening successful device energy-
consumption reporting 
    Smart Meters within the Smart Grid, are expected to be 
able to provide detailed consumption information about the 
home they are connected to in 15-minute intervals  
(compared to one month as is the case with the traditional 
grid) [25]. Such a development becomes synonymous to the 
collection and transmission of greater volumes of 
consumption data from Smart Home appliances and creates a 
major risk against customer privacy. During the transmission 
of this data from appliances to the EMS an eavesdropping 
attack [26] by an adversary for example, could result in 
valuable consumption data leaking to the adversary who can 
then process them to infer a lot about a customer’s lifestyle. 
Such processing of the data collected could mean passing 
them through a load profiling algorithm or through a use 
mode detection algorithm for example. In the first case an 
adversary can infer what devices are on at any given time 
(since each device has a distinctive load signature) [27].  In 
the second case specific information about the operation of 
the devices that are on can be revealed as well (eg. the 
channel a TV is tuned on!) [28]. By repeatedly collecting 
such information an adversary could actually intrude in a 
customer’s  private  life (Low Impact), knowing when he 
wakes up, when he goes to sleep, when he leaves for work, 
in what room he is at any given moment, when nobody is at 
home, even where the customer travels to (by collecting 
charging data from his PEV). This information could help an 
adversary plan more severe attacks against a customer 
(burglary, theft, kidnapping) (Moderate Impact). Presence 
information can also be inferred through traffic analysis 
attacks that do not reveal the data as such but their sending 
patterns (devices that are on send consumption messages 
more often) [22]. 
    Other potential attacks could include message 
modification attacks or replay attacks. Under such attacks, 
the adversary could insert new or replay older consumption 
messages of an appliance to the EMS, so that the Smart 
Meter receives false consumption data, resulting in the 
financial  burdening  of  a  customer  for  energy  he  hasn’t 
consumed [26] (Low Impact). EMS impersonation attacks 
are also a possibility under this scenario. Under such attacks, 
the adversary impersonates the EMS, so as to receive a 
device’s  consumption  data,  and  then  sends  those  messages 
either intact or modified to the Smart Meter and replies with 
acknowledgements back to the appliances. 
2) SH_2 :Attacks aiming Energy Import/Export signals at 
the ESI/HAN 
   As we mentioned above, the Smart Grid gives the 
consumer the opportunity to become a producer of energy as 
well as a consumer. By installing distributed energy 
resources at his premises, a customer can generate energy 
which he can sell to the grid at times when the demand 
surpasses the supply. Furthermore, by using his plug in 
electrical vehicle as a battery, a customer not only can store 
but also import energy from the grid at urgent times. Thus 
protecting it from damages caused by overloading. Messages 
requesting the exporting of energy to the grid/or the 
importing of energy from the grid, arrive to the ESI/HAN 
from the Smart Grid. The ESI/HAN then processes those 
messages and forwards suitable commands to PEVs and 
DERs. 
   Possible threats under the aforementioned scenario are 
presented on Table I and might involve for example an 
ESI/HAN impersonation by an adversary. Under such a 
scenario the adversary impersonating the ESI/HAN, might 
receive the energy export/import signals from the grid and 
drop them so they never reach the PEVs or DERs. An attack, 
that could cause significant grid instabilities, should it reach 
massive proportions (Moderate Impact). Another possible 
threat with similar outcomes could occur if a message 
modification attack against the integrity of the export/import 
signals, occurred [22]. Altering the contents of messages, 
either by increasing the amount of energy to be discharged 
from houses to the grid, or by decreasing the amount of 
energy to be absorbed from the grid could, if massive, cause 
the grid to be unstable.  In such a circumstance Demand 
Response or Load Shedding processes could be triggered 
even when they are truly unnecessary (Moderate Impact). 
Replay attacks requesting energy discharging at times of grid 
overloading and energy import at times of higher demand 
can cause analogous trouble (Moderate Impact). Repudiation 
is also an important threat under this scenario since we 
expect the customer to be collaborating with an ESP for the 
management of his DERs due to his lack of experience. In 
such a case the customer should not be able to suggest that 
his ESP did not react when it should have/ or reacted when it 
shouldn’t have. 
 
3) SH_3 : Physical meter tampering/ reversal or removal 
    Physical meter tampering incidents are common even in 
the era before Smart Grids [23][29]. With the meters 
becoming smarter we expect more incidents of physical 
meter tampering or fiddling with meter software to occur. 
Mischievous customers, trying to remove the meter, reverse 
the meter or alter its software, in an effort to relieve 
themselves from paying for their electrical bills, could 
become a common case in the Smart Grid future (Low 
Impact). 
 
4) SH_4 : Attacks against remote home monitoring and 
control. 
    Potential threats under such a scenario as presented on 
Table I, could include client impersonations by an adversary, 
message modification attacks, replay attacks etc. In a client  
impersonation attack [30], for example, an adversary 
impersonating the client could send messages to the 
ESI/HAN, requesting that all devices within the premise get 
switched on (thereby financially burdening the legitimate 
client- Low Impact), or that all devices get switched off (a 
scenario that could get life threatening connotations if life  
support equipment is included in those devices – High 
Impact) . Replay attacks and message modification attacks 
could also have significant implications on the Smart Home. 
The replay of a signal that operates the washing machine  
could result in clothes being rewashed again and again (Low 
Impact). Furthermore, the modification of a message to set 
the sprinkler into operation for 3 hours instead of 30 minutes 
could also have significant implications (Moderate Impact). 
These however, are not the only possible threats. Other kinds 
of attacks can occur as well. A device impersonation attack,  
carried out by an adversary, is one such example. In such an 
attack, the customer believes he is remotely controlling one 
device when in reality he controls another (for example, 
instead of setting the oven to 120°C , one could set the 
sauna’s  temperature  to  120°C  – automatically risking the 
lives of anyone in it – High Impact). Non-repudiation is also 
of particular importance to this scenario where we need 
ensure that no customer will be able to prove not sending a 
remote control message when he has, or sending one when 
he hasn’t.  
 
5)  SH_5 : Attacks aiming the requests for energy usage 
data. 
    The customer within the Smart Home, can request at any 
given time, to receive his detailed energy consumption 
profile. Consumption information are gradually collected by 
Smart Meters within the Smart Home, that are responsible to 
forward it to the MDMS system of the head end, which 
processes the metering data to apply billing information on 
them. The MDMS communicates with the CIS to store 
consumption information about each customer, which can be  
sent to him, upon request, along with feedback and 
suggestions [30]. Possible threats under such a scenario, are 
also presented on Table I and  include customer 
impersonation attacks by adversaries wishing to gain an 
inside to the consumption of legitimate customers (for 
reasons mentioned above), eavesdropping attacks (during the 
forwarding of CIS/MDMS to the In Home Display of the 
consumer) and also message modification attacks (requesting  
more detailed information). 
 
E. Smart Grid security issues 
   Having described possible security issues that could occur 
under the interaction of entities belonging to the Smart 
Home, we now move on to describing possible security 
issues that could affect Smart Grid entities with an impact on 
the Smart Grid as such. Below, we discuss potential threats 
and their possible outcomes, under some scenarios where 
Smart Grid entities could become attack targets. The 
scenarios are numbered following the symbolic notation 
SG_number, implying the scenario refers to an attack aiming 
at entities within the Smart Grid followed by the  scenario’s 
serial number. Table II provides a more concise view of the 
threats presented within each scenario described in this 
section, the security goals violated, and an impact evaluation. 
 
    We start by presenting three scenarios involving attacks 
against  the  Smart  Grid’s  head  end  servers  each  of  which 
aims to achieve a different blow to the head end [29]. 
 
 
 
1) SG_1 : Attacks aiming to steal data from utility servers. 
2) SG_2 :  Attacks aiming to take control of utility servers. 
3) SG_3 :  Attacks aiming to take down utility servers. 
 
    All  three  scenarios  described  above,  place  Smart  Grid’s 
head end servers as their primary target, aiming to either 
gain valuable information about the system or access into it, 
in order to steal data from it, take control over it or take it 
down. Collecting valuable information about the system, 
enables the adversary to plan a targeted attack against it 
whilst gaining access into the system, gives the adversary the 
opportunity to interact with it in any way he wants.  
   One way of collecting valuable information about the 
system could be by exploiting publicly available information 
about the utility through the Internet  [26]. Such information, 
if used in a smart way could give the adversary precious 
inside to help him plan an attack specifically targeting a 
weakness of the system. For example, Sean Gorman’s thesis 
[31] is now considered a classified document of the U.S 
government.  It presents the mapping of every company in 
America’s  industrial  sector  on  the  US’s  optical  fiber 
network, a mapping purely carried out using publicly 
available information as found on the Internet! A similar 
mapping within the Smart Grid could result in a detailed 
Smart Grid blueprint for everyone wishing to attack such a 
complex system(Moderate to High Impact). 
    Alternative ways of gathering information about the 
system, could include port scanning or ping sweeps, using 
freely available software such as Nmap, to reveal 
information about active hosts, network services they are 
using, the operating systems they are running etc. Moreover, 
vulnerability scanners such as Nessus could also be used to 
Scenario 
num:  
Possible Threads 
Security Goals 
Compromised 
Degree 
of 
Impact 
SH_1 Eavesdropping  (N) 
Traffic Analysis (N) 
Message Modification (N) 
Replay Attack  (N) 
EMS Impersonation (SH) 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
 
L-M 
SH_2 Repudiation (N) 
Message Modification( N) 
Replay Attack (N) 
Non repudiation 
Integrity 
Authentication 
M 
SH_3 Tampering/Reversal/ 
Removal of Meter (SH) 
Illegal Software 
Modification/Update(SH) 
Authentication 
Integrity 
L 
SH_4 Customer Impersonation (N)  
Device Impersonation (SH) 
Message Modification(N)  
Replay attack(N)  
Repudiation(N) 
Integrity  
Non repudiation 
Authentication 
L-H 
SH_5 Customer Impersonation(N) 
Eavesdropping/Message(N) 
Interception (N) 
Message Modification(N) 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
L-M 
TABLE I 
SMART HOME  SECURITY ISSUES 
help the attacker gain knowledge  regarding  the  system’s 
weaknesses, exposing operating system vulnerabilities, bad 
network design that does not ensure proper isolation or 
poorly defined firewall rules that could be exploited for the  
purposes of an outside attack [32] (Moderate to High 
Impact). 
   Attacks against the Smart Grid though can also be 
perpetrated from the inside. Such attacks can be carried out  
by disgruntled employees who have both the knowledge and 
the motive  to do harm  to  the Smart Grid’s head end, or by 
any other adversary who manages to gain access to the Smart 
Grid’s  head  end by  exploiting  social  engineering  attacks  or 
weak platform configurations [26][33]. By weak platform 
configurations we refer to poorly defined policies resulting 
in superfluous access rights being given to users, unsuitable 
or non-existent authentication mechanisms, poorly defined 
password policies that could result in easy-to-break 
passwords, data (eg. passwords) being transferred 
unencrypted through the network raising the chances of 
leakage due to sniffing etc. 
     Having collected information about the target system or 
having ensured a way to gain access to it, is the first step of 
many possible attacks against the Smart Grid head end. Such 
attacks could include system infections by malicious 
software and denial of service attacks. In fact, incidents of  
SCADA system infections by malicious software have 
already been reported several times in the past few years [34-
36] with Stuxnet, Flame and Duqu being infamous examples. 
The tremendous capabilities of this kind of software pose a 
major threat against any system within the Smart Grid. Such 
software can often modify or delete system files necessary 
for the system to operate, thus putting its availability at risk 
with severe consequences (High Impact). At the same time, 
non-system files such as log files, billing files, Load 
Shedding prioritization files could also serve as targets for 
modifications. By modifying a log file for example, an 
adversary could cover up his trace or frame an individual by 
implanting false evidence against him(Moderate Impact). By 
modifying load shedding prioritization files on the other 
hand, the implications could be even more severe. Fiddling 
with the degree of criticality of different areas could result in 
high-risk areas losing power supply in cases of emergency. 
A scenario, which could easily result in the loss of human 
life (High Impact). Of course, the capabilities of malicious 
software are not limited to those we just mentioned. Further 
features, such as key logging capabilities, conversation 
recording capabilities, come to add to this already powerful 
set of capabilities that can provoke irrevocable damage 
(High Impact). 
     Denial of Service attacks are also possible in such 
systems, and are considered to be amongst the most 
dangerous ones, since they could compromise network  
availability [26]. Such attacks could be the result of any 
effort to saturate the system’s resources to an extend where it 
can no longer respond to its legitimate traffic due to heavy 
overloading, something that could have severe or 
catastrophic outcomes for the grid (High Impact). 
 
4) SG_4 : Attacks against wide area measurement 
equipment. 
 
     Despite the fact that many attacks could affect the entities 
mentioned above, almost none of them can have comparable 
impact to a false data injection attack [37-38]. That is, an 
attack where adversaries manipulate measurements of field 
devices and metering devices in the Smart Grid network, 
introducing errors to those measurements destined for the 
head-end. False measurements going through the state 
estimation algorithm obviously result in a state estimation 
that has nothing to do with the actual state of the grid. As a 
result, the head-end, being ignorant to Smart  Grid’s actual 
state, reacts according to its perceived state, triggering Load 
Shedding or Demand Response programs at wrong times, 
wrongly estimating the demand of the next day thereby 
increasing the chances for instabilities or rolling blackouts 
etc. [33] (Moderate to High Impact). 
 
TABLE II 
                          SMART GRID SECURITY ISSUES 
F.  Smart Home /Smart Grid Security Issues 
  Having acquired a more comprehensive view regarding 
threats to both the Smart Home and Smart Grid as individual 
elements, we can identify some of the main threats that aim 
at their interaction. This section is dedicated to threats 
initially affecting or taking control of entities within the 
Smart Home that end up affecting entities within the Smart 
Grid. The scenarios presented in this section are thus 
numbered following the symbolic notation SH-SG_number, 
standing for Smart Home initiated attacks affecting the 
Smart Grid  followed by  the  scenario’s  serial number. Table 
III provides a more concise view of the threats presented 
within each scenario of this section, the security goals 
violated and an impact evaluation. 
 
1) SH-SG_1: Attacks aiming the Demand Response 
signals at the ESI/HAN 
 
Under such a scenario an adversary could choose to 
impersonate the ESI/HAN so as to intercept the Demand 
Response signals intended for it, in order to replace them 
with older ones (as part of a replay attack). An adversary can 
also modify signals received by the ESI/HAN (as part of a 
Scenario 
num:  
Possible Threads 
Security Goals 
Compromised 
Degree 
of 
Impact 
SG_1 Publicly available info  
Weak platform config.  
Software vulnerabilities  
Malware  
Insider attacks 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Authorization 
Authenticity  
 
M-H 
SG_2 Publicly available info  
Weak platform config.  
Software vulnerabilities  
Malware  
Passive Net Recon. 
Message Fabrication 
Replay attacks 
Fiddling with 
system/non system files 
 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Authorization 
Non repudiation 
Authenticity 
 
M-H 
SG_3 Eavesdropping  
Traffic Analysis 
Man-In-The-Middle  
Message Modification 
Replay Attack  
Device Impersonation 
Denial of Service 
Fiddling with 
system/non system files 
Confidentiality 
Integrity 
Availability 
Authenticity 
Authorization 
 
H 
SG_4 False Data Injection 
Attacks 
Malware 
Integrity 
Availability 
M-H 
message modification attack), before they are forwarded to 
the EMS or to the appliances/PEVs and DERs they are  
supposed to reach. These attacks could trick the ESI/HAN 
into issuing inappropriate signals towards the EMS or the 
appliances and could mislead the customer through false 
notifications via the In Home Display (regarding the tariffs 
or the urgency of DR signals received – Low Impact). As a 
result, appliances could be scheduled to operate at times 
when the Smart Grid is overloaded, thus further increasing 
the  grid’s  load (Low to Moderate Impact) and also 
financially burdening the customer. 
In addition to the aforementioned, another kind of attack 
aiming to disrupt the communication between the ESI/HAN 
and the appliances or the ESI/HAN and the EMS could occur 
under this scenario. This attack, known as jamming attack 
[13], is carried out by an adversary who introduces noise in 
the wireless medium connecting the ESI/HAN with the EMS 
or the appliances, aiming to reduce the strength of the carried 
signal (Signal to Noise Ratio – SNR). Should such an attack 
be successful the Demand Response server cannot 
communicate with its clients, thus the operation of devices 
cannot be rescheduled and people cannot receive proper 
feedback thus continue operating their devices regardless of 
the grid’s state (Moderate). 
Potential attacks under this scenario, can also be launched 
by the customer. More specifically, a mischievous customer 
who has agreed to participate in a Demand Response 
Program could decide to carry out a device impersonation 
attack so that he never has to postpone using his devices for 
later. By having for example his electric kettle impersonate 
his  tumble  dryer  the  signal  received  at  the  customer’s 
premise for rescheduling the operation of large controllable 
loads (including the tumble dryer) will affect the electric 
kettle instead, without the utility realizing the difference. 
Such  an  attack  “benefits”  the  customer  who  gets  rewarded 
for his participation but can use his devices without any 
limitation. However this harms the Smart Grid, that expects 
to shave the peaks in demand but does not get the anticipated 
outcome (Low to Moderate Impact depending on scale). 
Finally, repudiation incidents are also possible under this 
scenario. A client for example, could deny having received a 
Demand Response signal to explain the reasons he did not 
participate in the program and avoid the incurred penalties. 
 
2) SH-SG_2 : Attacks threatening successful Outage 
Reporting. 
Potential threats in this case could refer to meter 
impersonation attacks by an adversary,  followed by a replay 
attack. In such a case, older messages (power outage reports) 
sent to OMS are replayed even when there is no interruption 
to service so that personnel is dispatched to specific areas 
when there is actually no need [30]. Such tasteless "jokes" 
are undoubtedly a hassle to the utility that makes every effort 
to ensure quality of service for its customers (Low Impact). 
 
3) SH-SG_3 : Attacks threatening successful DER 
shutdown/isolation reporting 
Meter impersonations, replay attacks and message 
modification attacks are only some of the possible attacks 
under this scenario. By impersonating the meter, the 
adversary can drop packets destined for it and replace them 
with older ones (he has intercepted and/or modified) or new 
ones (he has created), thus making the meters report a 
false/inaccurate outcome to the grid resulting in a distorted 
image of the grid’s state being conveyed to its operators and 
thus to the personnel dispatched to handle the situation, with 
none of them knowing whether any errors occurred during 
shut down or islanding processes (Low to Moderate Impact 
depending on scale) . 
 
4) SH_SG_4 : Attacks against the NAN aggregator. 
Attacks under this scenario could involve either the 
passive interception of data to be transferred from the 
ESI/HAN to the Smart Meter (and from then on to the NAN 
aggregator), or an active modification of existing 
data/injection of new data in the grid. In the former case, we 
refer to an eavesdropping attack that invades customer 
privacy and exposes the kinds of communication protocols 
used, something that could help the adversary plan and carry 
out a meter impersonation attack injecting false traffic in the 
grid, with known consequences [39] (Low to Moderate 
Impact). 
In the latter case, we refer to message modification attacks 
and false data injection attacks that could result in erroneous 
data being transferred to the head-end giving it an inaccurate 
view of the  Grid’s current state [40] (Moderate to High 
Impact). Man-In-the-Middle attacks, where the adversary 
impersonates the meter to the NAN aggregator and the NAN 
aggregator to the meter, are also likely to occur. Such 
attacks, give the adversary the complete control of all 
metering traffic flowing to the NAN aggregators (and thus to 
the grid) putting the Smart Grid at great risk (especially 
when being large-scale). Finally, Denial of Service attacks, 
aiming to overload the NAN aggregators until they can no 
longer receive their legitimate traffic, are also a possibility 
under this scenario (Moderate to High Impact). 
 
 
TABLE III 
SMART HOME TO SMART GRID SECURITY ISSUES 
Scenario 
num:  
Possible Threads 
Security Goals 
Compromised 
Degree 
of 
Impact 
SH_SG1 ESI Impersonation 
Message Modification 
Replay Attacks  
Jamming Attacks 
Device Impersonation 
Repudiation 
Integrity  
Availability  
Authenticity  
Non 
Repudiation 
L-M 
SH_SG2 Meter Impersonation and 
Replay attack 
 
Integrity  
Availability  
Authenticity 
L 
SH_SG3 Meter Impersonation / 
Message Modification 
Replay attack 
Integrity L-M 
SH_SG4 Eavesdropping 
Message Meditation  
ManInTheMiddle 
False Data Injection 
Denial of Service 
Integrity 
Confidentiality 
Authenticity 
 
L-H 
G. Smart Grid to Smart Home security issues 
 
   The last category of threats we are going to present are the 
threats that start by affecting entities within the Smart Grid , 
and evolve in ways that affect the environment of the Smart 
Home. The scenarios presented in this section are numbered 
following the symbolic notation SG-SH_number, standing 
for Smart Grid initiated attacks affecting the Smart Home 
followed by the scenario’s serial number. Table IV provides 
a more concise view of the threats presented in each scenario 
of this section, the security goals violated, and an impact 
evaluation. 
 1) SG-SH_1 : Attacks aiming Demand Response signals 
to the ESI/HAN 
  Possible attacks under this scenario, as illustrated in Table 
IV, could include the impersonation of the DRMS system by 
an adversary, who could then repeat older Demand Response 
messages as part of a replay attack. Such an attack could 
cause discomfort at the customer site and result in the 
financial burdening of the customer (Low Impact), primarily 
due to the fact that ESI/HAN and EMS systems responding 
to the Demand Response signals will schedule device 
operation at different times that are not necessarily the most 
profitable for the customer or the most beneficial for the 
Grid (Moderate Impact). Another possible attack under this 
scenario, could be a message modification attack. Under this 
kind of attack the adversary modifies the contents of 
messages created by the DRMS server (such as the pricing 
signal or the urgency) and forwards these messages to the 
customer site that reacts as described above(Low to 
Moderate depending on scale). False synchronization attacks 
are also probable under this scenario. This kind of attacks 
aim at fiddling with synchronization messages exchanged 
between DRMS and ESI/HAN and result in stringent timing 
requirements not being met by the system due to poor 
synchronization, with consequences affecting the entire 
Demand Response program(Moderate Impact).  
 
2) SG-SH_2 : Attacks aiming Direct Load Shedding 
signals to the ESI/HAN 
Sometimes, when the demand for electricity exceeds the 
available supply, planned supply interruptions in the form of 
load shedding, may have to be carried out in order to avoid 
instabilities in the grid that could damage its equipment. 
Such power supply interactions are triggered by an LMS 
server that is responsible for issuing and forwarding 
commands to premises at specific areas according to a 
predetermined schedule [25]. Denial of Service (DoS) 
attacks under such a scenario could prove to be particularly 
dangerous, since they can prevent these urgent signals from 
being delivered to destination on time, thus putting the grid’s 
availability at risk (High Impact). DoS attacks could target 
either the LMS server or the physical medium connecting it 
to the ESI/HAN (if they take the form of jamming attacks) 
     A different kind of attack could involve the fiddling of an 
adversary with Load Shedding schedules which could result 
in critical areas losing their power supply, or the same non-
critical areas being affected again and again. The 
consequences of such attacks could range from simple 
discomfort of customers (Low Impact) that have to lose their 
power supply over and over again, to the power loss in 
critical areas that could even put human life to risk (High 
Impact). Similar consequences could be observed under a 
replay attack, carried out by an adversary replaying older 
Load Shedding signals. 
 
     
3)  SG-SH_3: Attacks aiming Energy Import/Export 
signals to the ESI/HAN 
   DER encompasses both generation and storage.  
Generation coming from DER units such as photovoltaics, 
wind turbines, diesel generators and small hydro plants 
situated  at  the  customer’s  premises  are  expected to be 
controlled by the utility or a third party ESP via the AMI 
system. Depending on the capabilities of the DER controller, 
schedules for net import/export levels can be predetermined 
so that units successfully discharge energy into the grid at 
times of increased demand  or store energy from it in case 
load shifting from on-peak to off-peak hours needs to take 
place. 
  Replay attacks are amongst the attacks more likely to occur 
under such scenarios [30]. In this kind of attacks former 
messages for energy import/export are replayed, regardless 
of the needs of the grid, causing energy to be drawn from the 
grid at times of high demand, or energy being released to the 
grid at times when it is not necessary (Moderate to High 
Impact). Also likely to happen under this scenario, are 
message modifications attacks. These attacks are launched 
by an adversary that distorts messages containing the 
amounts of energy to be exported or imported causing the 
grid to behave in ways contrary to its true needs and creating 
the opportunity for brownouts and blackouts to occur 
(Moderate to High Impact). Similar outcomes could be 
observed by carrying out DoS attacks against the channel 
between the DRMS/LMS and the ESI/HAN, so as to render 
it incapable of forwarding its signals on time, to its 
legitimate receivers (Moderate to High Impact).  
 
4) SG-SH_4 : Attacks aiming customer related data 
forwarded to a third trusted ESP 
    Highly probable attacks under such a scenario, could 
involve the impersonation by an adversary of the third party 
ESP or eavesdropping, in order for the adversary to receive 
the energy consumption and urgency messages destined to 
the third party ESP from the utility. Thus, violating customer  
privacy (Low to Moderate Impact according to what these 
data are used for) and potentially disrupting the 
communication of the utility with the third party ESP, 
preventing it from acting to the advantage of the customer. 
 
TABLE IV 
SMART GRID TO SMART HOME SECURITY ISSUES 
IV. SMARTHOME/SMART GRID SECURITY 
COUNTERMEASURES 
In this section, we present several promising 
countermeasures suggested in literature which could be 
adopted against the different attacks identified in section III. 
As tabulated in Tables I to IV, several security goals are 
compromised. In the following section we see how each of 
Scenario 
num:  
Possible Threads 
Security Goals 
Compromised 
Degree 
of 
Impact 
SG_SH1 Message Modification 
Impersonation of 
DRMS/LMS  
 Replay of Previous 
Messages 
False Synchronization 
Attack 
Integrity 
Authenticity 
 
L-M 
SG_SH2 Denial of Service attacks 
Access the DRMs/LMS 
server 
False synchronization 
attack 
Replay attack 
Availability 
Integrity 
Non repudiation 
Authenticity 
L-H 
SG_SH3 Replay attack 
Message Modification 
Attack 
Denial of Service attacks 
Authentication 
Integrity 
Availability 
M-H 
SG_SH4 ESP Impersonation 
Eavesdropping  
Integrity  
Authenticity 
Confidentiality 
L-M 
these goals may be fulfilled through a detailed survey of 
approaches and a comprehensive description of various 
techniques. A summarized view of the approaches presented 
in this section is provided in Table V. 
A. Ensuring Confidentiality and Privacy 
   In section III we introduced Confidentiality as the security 
dimension concerned with preventing unauthorized access to 
specific information. Confidentiality might not be considered 
as the most critical dimension of Smart Grid Cyber Security; 
however it is one of the key concerns for the consumers as it 
is inextricably linked to their privacy. This section is devoted 
to presenting ways of ensuring confidentiality and privacy 
within the Smart Home/Smart Grid communication 
environment, as they are proposed in recent literature. 
 
1) Ensuring Confidentiality 
   The most basic technique of achieving confidentiality 
nowadays is through cryptography. Modern cryptographic 
techniques available today, can be classified into two broad 
categories according to the type of key they use. The first 
category, includes symmetric key algorithms and it is also 
known as private-key cryptography, since both sender and 
receiver share a secret key for their communication. The 
second category includes asymmetric key algorithms and it 
is also known as public key cryptography since each of the 
communicating parties has its public key (known to all other 
parties) and its private key (which is kept secret)[41][42]. 
    In an effort to ensure greater interoperability amongst 
security mechanisms within the grid the Cyber Security 
Work Group of the National Institute of Standards of the U.S 
evaluated (in 2010) the usability and expected lifespan of 
known symmetric and asymmetric algorithms [25]. 
Symmetric algorithms (such as the standards AES and 
TDES) are expected to be used for the purpose of data 
encryption within the Smart Grid. Asymmetric algorithms on 
the other hand, (such as the approved RSA, DSA, ECDSA 
etc.) are expected to be used for the purpose of digitally 
signing messages. 
    Of course cryptography is not only used for the purposes 
of ensuring confidentiality. Many works presented below, 
regarding ways of providing integrity, authenticity, non-
repudiation and even authorization, exploit cryptography in 
one way or another. 
 
2) Ensuring Privacy 
    Since their appearance, smart metering deployments have 
raised numerous concerns for being potentially privacy 
invasive. As we discuss in the previous section, the 
consumption data collected by smart meters can reveal a lot 
about the behavior, activities and habits of the residents 
within a premise, thus causing fear to customers. To date, 
various models have been proposed for ensuring the privacy 
of metering data within the Smart Home/Smart Grid 
environment.  Our literature review regarding privacy 
enhancing technologies has revealed a variety of techniques 
that can be used alone or in combination to ensure privacy 
[43]. Some of these techniques are briefly introduced below. 
 
 Ensuring privacy can be achieved through:  
  Anonymization : A process that removes the link 
between data and its origin in such a way, that the 
utility can receive the data it requires for carrying 
out its computations, but cannot attribute the 
received data to a specific meter. 
  Trusted Aggregators : The meter or a third trusted 
party are considered to be trusted entities that can 
handle the aggregation of metering data and their 
forwarding to the utility. The utility in such a case 
can use only the aggregates of data without being 
able to have access to individual consumption 
information of participating meters. 
  Homomorphic Encryption: A form of encryption 
that allows specific types of computations to be 
carried out on ciphertext and obtain an encrypted 
result which decrypted matches the result of 
operations performed on the plaintext. The utility in 
such a case can decrypt the ciphertext of the 
aggregate of metering data but not the individual 
metering of the plaintext. 
  Perturbation models: Models that introduce 
random noise from a known distribution to the 
privacy sensitive metering data, before they are 
transmitted to utility. The utility receiving the 
perturbed data reconstructs an approximation of the 
original data. A tradeoff between the level of 
privacy achieved and the loss of information exists. 
  Verifiable Computation models: Models in which 
the aggregator provides a proof along with the 
aggregate of metering data, that the calculation has 
been performed as claimed. Such proof can be 
provided through a zero knowledge proof system, 
with the smart meter being the prover and the utility 
the verifier. In zero knowledge proof the verifier 
only confirms the prover has the knowledge he 
claims to have and nothing more than that. 
  Data obfuscation techniques: Battery-based 
approaches that aim to conceal the amount of 
energy consumed by a premise by buffering or 
releasing their energy load. 
 
    We begin with work of Efthymiou et. al., [44], describing 
a method for securely anonymizing electric metering data. 
Their approach distinguishes amongst two types of traffic 
carried by a Smart Meter. Low frequency data i.e. data 
necessary for billing or account management purposes that 
need to be attributable and collected every day/week/month 
etc. and High frequency data, i.e. data needed for the 
efficient operation of the Smart Grid (Demand Response 
programs, demand estimation etc.), that should be collected 
every minute/five minutes but don’t need  to be attributable. 
The meters in this scheme have two IDs embedded within 
them, one for high and one for low frequency data.The low 
frequency ID (LFID) will be public, so that it can be used by 
the utility for billing a customer for his consumption. The 
high frequency ID (HFID) on the other hand has to remain 
hidden, so that no one will be able to identify the source of 
specific metering data. In order to maintain its secrecy, the 
high frequency ID should be hardcoded within the device 
whereas for the purposes of verifying an HFID is valid a 
third party escrow service is introduced, knowing the 
relationship between a valid HFID and LFID. 
   A different protocol, combining anonymization techniques 
with verifiable computation without implying reliance on 
any gateway or Third Trusted Party is suggested by Jeske in 
[45]. His protocol essentially consists of two sub-protocols 
an Invoicing subprotocol, and a Load Reporting subprotocol. 
A smart meter uses the invoicing protocol to send the overall 
electric power consumption to the utility, encrypted and 
signed asymmetrically. During the invoicing process, the 
identities of both the customer and the meter are kept public.  
The Load Reporting Protocol, however exploits a different 
idea, namely group signature schemes. For the purposes of 
this protocol every smart meter is said to belong to a group 
(whose group manager is the energy provider). Whenever a 
meter wishes to report its consumption, it signs it using the 
name of the group. The energy provider can thus only verify 
the participation of a meter within a group, without being 
able to infer any further information about it specifically. 
The system utilized for group signatures is based on the 
model of Camenisch and Lysyanskaya [46]. In such a model 
once the meter has proven in a zero-knowledge manner that 
it holds a ticket signed by the provider and that the 
timestamp of the data it wishes to transfer is valid, it asks the 
provider to confirm its validity and sign the next ticket it will 
need. 
     An alternative approach is presented by Li et. al., in [47]. 
Their suggestion leverages a distributed incremental 
aggregation approach, where aggregation is performed on 
every meter in the route towards the utility. A carefully 
constructed aggregation tree efficiently connects all the 
nodes of an entire neighborhood to a collector device. Every 
node on this tree, which is essentially the spanning tree 
corresponding to the graph of the network of interconnected 
meters within a neighborhood, collects data from its children 
nodes, aggregates them and forwards them to its parent node, 
that repeats the process until the data reaches the root. At the 
root we find the collector, that handles the communication 
with the utility. To secure the data enroute, Paillier 
homomorphic encryption scheme is used, allowing for 
meters to participate in the aggregation process without 
being able to see any intermediate or final result. 
    Another idea is introduced by Acs et.al in [48], who 
propose their own privacy preserving scheme for smart 
metering data that uses homomorphic encryption and 
exploits the idea of perturbation. The encryption algorithm 
introduced by the authors is defined as the addition of the 
measurement with the encryption key, modulo a large 
number. Since this cryptosystem is homomorphic with 
respect to addition it follows that:  
 �ሺ�ͳ,�ͳሻ + �ሺ�ʹ,�ʹሻ = �ͳ + �ͳ +�ʹ + �ʹ ��� �     ሺͳሻ      = �൫ሺ�ͳ + �ʹሻ, ሺ�ͳ +�ʹሻ൯ 
 
Where k1,k2 are the keys, m1 and m2 are the measurements 
and n is the large number. 
    To make  things  quite  simpler  to  understand,  let’s  use  an 
example.  Let’s  suppose  that Alice wants to communicate 
with Bob and Charli.e. Then both Alice and Bob have to feed 
a pseudorandom generator with their shared key, something 
that returns a random number r1,2 that will be added to Alice’s  measurements  and  subtracted  by  Bob’s 
measurements. The same process should then be repeated 
between Alice and Charlie resulting in r1,3. After Alice has 
added r1,3 to  her results she will come to the sum presented 
below, which she will then send to the utility encrypted with 
their shared key. 
 �ሺ�������������,�ͳ, �ሻ = �ͳ, � + �ͳ,ʹ + �ͳ,͵ +������������� ��� �   ሺʹሻ     
 
Similarly Bob and Charlie will send their aggregates to the 
utility encrypted  using the shared key each one maintains 
with the utility. The utility will then compute the aggregate 
and thus receive the sum of all the measurements that were 
sent to it.  
 ��� �ሺ�������������, �ͳ, �ሻ + �ሺ�����������, �ʹ, �ሻ +  �ሺ��ℎ������������, �͵, �ሻ           ሺ͵ሻ     = ሺ�ͳ, � + �ͳ,ʹ + �ͳ,͵ + ������������� ��� � +�ʹ, � − �ͳ,ʹ + �ʹ,͵ + ����������� ��� � 
                   +�͵, � − �ͳ,͵ − �ʹ,͵ +��ℎ������������ ��� �ሻ = ሺ�ͳ, � +�ʹ, � +�͵, � + ������������� +����������� +��ℎ������������ ሻ��� � 
  
The individual measurements are never revealed during this  
process. To maintain the privacy of the information the 
authors introduced Laplacian noise to the final aggregate 
before encrypting it. To succeed in doing so every meter that 
participated in the process introduced gamma noise on its 
measurement before encryption. Thus every mi,t presented 
above was actually the result of the addition of the actual 
measurement (moi,t) with two independent values randomly 
selected from the same gamma distribution : 
 ��, � = ���, � + �ͳሺ�, �ሻ − �ʹሺ�, �ሻ        ሺͶሻ 
 
   The final idea we present for the purposes of ensuring 
privacy, belongs to Varodayan et.al. [49], who propose the 
use of a rechargeable battery to partially protect the privacy 
of information derived from  a  premise’s  electrical  load 
profile. This battery receives the aggregate load of all 
appliances within a household as an input, and outputs a load 
that is the result of the combination of the load of the battery 
and all the appliances. This is the load reported by the smart 
meter to the utility.  At any given moment, the battery can 
either supply the energy it receives from the utility directly 
to  the  household’s  appliances, keep it for future use, or 
supply the appliances with its residue. Thus through this 
charging and discharging procedure the battery can obfuscate 
the exact load reported by appliances. The suggested model 
for charging and discharging the battery is stochastic, i.e. 
every decision for a state transition happens with a certain 
probability. A trellis algorithm is exploited to estimate the 
rate of information leakage. 
 
B. Ensuring Integrity, Authenticity and Non Repudiation 
 
   Just as important as ensuring the confidentiality of personal 
data within the Smart Grid/Smart Home is to ensure data 
integrity and authenticity (regardless of their degree of 
privacy). This section is dedicated to presenting techniques 
of achieving these two key goals by reviewing related 
literature.  
 
 
1) Ensuring Integrity 
 
   Inspired by traditional ways of ensuring integrity, 
cryptographic hashing techniques, designed for high integrity 
assurance in traditional networks could potentially be applied 
to the Smart Grid as well, provided they do not introduce 
prohibitive delays. When using such techniques the sending 
side uses a hash function to compute the checksum of the 
message to be sent and attach it to the original message [41]. 
Upon receiving the message, the receiving side applies the 
same hash function to the message and compares resulting 
hash to the hash attached in the original message. Should the 
two hashes match, integrity is verified (i.e. it is proven that 
the message contents have not been altered in transit as a 
result of e.g. a message modification attack). 
   Attacks against integrity though are not only confined to 
message modifications. False data injection attacks, replay 
attacks, device impersonation attacks, and sparse attacks are 
also  considered  to  be  major  threats  against  a  system’s 
integrity. Recent literature focusing on these attacks and their 
countermeasures may be limited; however  it  doesn’t  lack 
interesting ideas.  
   Bhattarai et.al in [50], present their own light weight 
digital watermarking technique as a simple, low-cost and 
efficient way to ensure defense against false data injection 
attacks. Digital watermarking is a technique of embedding 
digital data inside real time meter readings, with the 
watermark carrying unique information about the owner of 
the reading. The purpose of the watermark is to validate the 
integrity of data. Watermarked data, are sent from the meter 
to the utility through high speed unsecured networks that are 
prone to false data injection attacks. To ensure the successful 
detection of these attacks , the meters use low rate and 
secured channels to securely transmit the watermarks. The 
utility thus receives both the watermarks and the 
watermarked data, in order to correlate them and detect false 
data injection attacks. 
   Huang et.al. in [51], show that even without prior 
knowledge  of  the  power  grid’s  topology  an  adversary can 
still successfully launch stealthy bad data injection attacks. 
Specifically the authors prove that when the system 
dynamics are small and can be approximated linearly, an 
independent component analysis can be applied to calculate 
the Jacobian matrix that if multiplied by the eigenvectors of 
the covariance matrix of the state variables can expose 
information necessary to the adversary wishing to launch an 
unobservable false data injection attack. As a 
countermeasure, the authors introduce their adaptive 
cumulative sum algorithm, a recursive algorithm comprising 
of two interleaved stages. The first introduces the linear 
unknown parameter solver while the second applies the 
multi-threated CUSUM algorithm. The proposed defense 
mechanism aims at detecting attacks as quickly as possible 
with a minimum number of observations while maintaining a 
satisfactory level of accuracy.  
    Unobservable attacks involving the compromise of a 
modest number of power meter readings, specially designed 
and orchestrated to remain undetectable by bad data 
detection algorithms are the focus of Giani et.al in [52]. In 
their paper, the authors propose their own algorithm for 
detecting stealthy attacks and suggest the installation of 
known-secure phasor measurement units (PMUs) at specific 
buses, to thwart an arbitrary collection of attacks (not only 
sparse attacks). The minimum number of PMUs necessary to 
make the attacks observable is an NP-hard problem, thus the 
authors suggest an upper bound on the minimal number of 
PMUs required and present an algorithm to determine their 
placement. Their findings suggest p+1 PMUs are sufficient 
to disable p attacks. 
   As far as device impersonation attacks are concerned, 
Aravinthan et. al., suggest in [13], the use of load profiling 
algorithms as a countermeasure. In their suggested scheme, 
before an appliance can be put into operation, it seeks a 
permission from the AMI. The AMI either allows its 
operation or reschedules it for later according to the 
advertised class of the device and its current load. Every time 
a device is advertised to the AMI the AMI sends a previously 
formed load profile of that device to the outlet controlling 
the device so that a comparison can be made. If the loading 
pattern does not match the known profile then the outlet will 
not allow the device to operate. 
   When it comes to replay attacks, many different 
suggestions exist including the use of timestamps/ sequence 
numbers/ session keys, all suggested by Aravinthan et. al. in 
[13], or including the use of nonces (numbers used once) 
making each message unique, as suggested by Xiao et. al., in 
[53]. An interesting alternative to these approaches is the 
physical authentication methodology suggested by Mo et. al., 
in [54]. 
 
2) Ensuring Authenticity and Non repudiation 
 
    Ensuring authenticity and assuring that we can prove the 
truthfulness of any allegation regarding transactions within 
the Smart Grid, are also important for the overall Smart Grid 
security.  
   As we already mentioned above, cryptographic hash 
functions, are nowadays used for ensuring message integrity 
against deliberate alterations, the same way as checksums are 
used for detecting inadvertent ones. Similar to cryptographic 
hash functions, with the exception that they make use of a 
secret key, are message authentication codes such as HMAC 
which are amongst the most widely used approaches for 
achieving authenticity today [41]. Such schemes can also be 
used within the Smart Grid and so can digital signature 
schemes that ensure message authenticity via asymmetric 
encryption. These schemes operate on the premise that every 
communicating entity has its own public-private key pair. 
Before sending a message encrypted with the receiver’s 
public key, the sender can hash the message and sign the 
hash with his private key. Upon receiving the message, the  
receiver uses his private key to decrypt it and evaluate its 
hash, and the public key of the sender to decrypt the original 
hash [41]. The two hashes are then compared, if they match 
the integrity of the message is proven and so is its 
authenticity (since no one, other than the sender, could have 
signed  the  message  with  the  sender’s  private  key). 
Meanwhile, non-repudiation can also be achieved if the 
sender demands a signed acknowledgement from the 
receiver, verifying he indeed received the message. 
   Alternative ways for achieving message authenticity and 
non-repudiation specifically designed for the Smart Grid 
have also been proposed in recent literature. Below, we 
present a number of interesting approaches. 
   Nabeel et.al. in [55], propose the use of Physically 
Unclonable Function (PUF) modules within meters for 
achieving strong hardware based authentication of smart 
meters and efficient key management. Key management 
guarantees the confidentiality and integrity of messages 
transmitted from smart meters to the utility and vice versa. 
PUFs are functions embodied in a physical structure 
inexpensive to manufacture but impossible to replicate even 
given the exact manufacturing process. Due to their  
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
unclonability they can be described as the hardware analogs 
of one-way functions. PUFs implement challenge – response 
authentication, i.e. they receive a stimulus (challenge) that 
interacts with their physical microstructure (which is 
considered to be unique due to the intrinsic randomness in 
the fabrication process of integrated circuits) and react by 
providing an unpredictable yet repeatable response. PUFs 
map challenges to responses in a way that cannot be 
predicted or replicated. Their properties are exploited by the 
authors along with Pedersen commitment scheme and the 
Zero-Knowledge proof of knowledge protocol to ensure 
confidentiality, integrity and authenticity but also protect the 
secret keys used by Smart Meters. 
 A different approach towards message authentication, is 
proposed by Fouda et. al., in [56].  In their paper, the authors 
introduce a lightweight message authentication scheme as a 
crucial component of their envisioned framework for secure 
Smart Grid communications, in which smart meters are 
expected to be authenticated before they can communicate 
with other smart meters or smart grid gateways within the 
Grid. Their proposed scheme based on Diffie-Helman key 
establishment and hash-based authentication codes, can be 
simplistically described as follows. Suppose we have two 
devices i and j wanting to communicate with one another as 
shown on Figure 3. At the first step of this scheme, i will 
select a random number a, raise his g in the power of a, 
encrypt i||j||g
a using j’s public key and send this message to j. 
At the second step j, who has followed the same procedure to  
produce his g
b
, decrypts the message and sends his response 
i||j||g
a 
||g
b
 back to i encrypted with i’s public key. Following 
these two steps both parties can now evaluate g
ab 
and thus 
derive their shared session key as the hash H(i||j||g
ab
) where 
H is a secure cryptographic hash function. 
   More recently Lu et. al., in [57], presented an experimental 
approach on a small scale substation automation prototype 
aiming to determine whether current security solutions can 
be applied directly to substation automation systems (SAS) 
without implications. Commonly used mechanisms and 
algorithms ensuring authentication and integrity such as 
RSA, Message Authentication Codes and One-Time 
Signatures were all evaluated for their ability to ensure 
message authenticity and integrity while not violating the 
stringent timing requirements introduced by certain message 
categories and despite being run on devices with limited 
processing power. Their results suggest that RSA can be 
deployed for the protection of messages transmitted across 
substations, but is not suitable for the transmission of delay-
sensitive messages within the substations, whereas MAC-
attached and HORS-signed messages demonstrate better 
delay performance for delay sensitive communications  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
within the substation. Their paper concludes by stressing the 
need for better suited security solutions for substation 
automation system communications.  
   Turning our attention to non-repudiation now, we 
introduce the work of Xiao et. al. [53], who present a mutual 
inspection strategy aiming to ensure non-repudiation of 
smart meter readings within the neighborhood area networks 
of the Smart Grid. Their strategy involves the installation of 
two smart meters with one electric wire connecting the 
sending side with the receiving side. The meter on one side 
represents  the  subscriber’s  reading  whilst  the  meter  on  the 
other  end  represents  the  provider’s  reading.  These  two 
readings are not always expected to be the same even under 
normal circumstances due to power losses during energy 
transfer, synchronization issues and other delays. However, 
sometimes their inconsistency could suggest meter 
compromise, jamming or any other sort of attack. In such 
cases, the readings of the two ends are exchanged and the 
inconsistency is checked against an acceptable threshold. 
Should the reading be proved to be the result of compromise, 
further investigation will begin. The authors compliment 
their approach with a security analysis and an evaluation that 
shows the mutual inspection technique can achieve 
satisfactory performance when combined with an optimized 
time window method. 
    Alternatively, Aravinthan et. al., [13] suggest that both the 
customers and the AMI use unique keys for encryption (once 
they have authenticated one another using their preassigned 
public-private key pairs). In addition to that, they suggest 
that the AMI keeps a log of all transactions for a predefined 
number of days, so that disagreements can be resolved, 
though tracing back the events. 
 
C. Ensuring Availability 
 
   Usually, when presenting security requirements for a 
system using the basic CIA triad (Confidentiality, Integrity, 
Availability)  the ordering does not have any specific 
meaning. However, when it comes to the Smart Grid/Smart 
Home, some stakeholders suggest that the triad should be 
prioritized as Availability Integrity Confidentiality (AIC) so 
that the ordering reflects that availability is the most 
important goal, followed by integrity and then confidentiality 
[58].  
   Potential attacks against the availability of the Smart Grid, 
were introduced in section III under the general name 
“Denial  of  Service  attacks”  defining  attacks  aiming  to 
saturate the Grid’s resources in order to prevent it from being 
accessible to its legitimate users.  A number of attacks we 
Fig.3 Lightweight message authentication by Fouda et.al. [56]. 
introduced were attacks in the physical layer. Such physical 
layer attacks were the False Data Injection Attacks 
(countermeasures for which were presented in the section for 
Ensuring Integrity) and jamming attacks for which 
countermeasures will be introduced below. 
    Aravinthan et. al., in [13] suggest that the best way to 
defend against intentional jamming is to use multiple 
alternate frequency channels when interference is detected in 
the current channel. According to them, the AMI and all 
nodes within it, could be programmed to move though a 
common, predefined sequence of channels, hardcoded into 
them, if the default channel suffers from packet losses that 
are above an acceptable threshold, for a specified period. 
Every node that gets introduced into the AMI network and 
authenticated to it, receives this predefined channel-hopping 
sequence  encrypted  with  the  customer’s  public  key.  The 
node then retrieves the sequence by decrypting with the 
customer’s  private  key  and  begins  communicating  in  the 
current channel used. According to the authors, due to the 
pseudo randomness of the channel-hopping sequence it is 
considered difficult for the jammer to predict what channel is 
to be used next, and thus to perform a jamming attack 
against it.  
   A similar opinion, seems to be shared by Lee et.al in [59]. 
In their work, they propose a random spread-spectrum-based 
wireless communication scheme that prevents eavesdropping 
and active attacks, while also ensuring protection against 
jamming. Their proposed scheme, called Frequency Quorum 
Rendezvous (FQR), introduces the novelty of coordinating 
two random hopping sequences using a quorum system, a 
property that guarantees the sender and the receiver will 
rendezvous within a bounded time. A quorum system is a 
collection of subsets (or quorums) of a universal set. Each 
subset of this set has at least one common element with 
every other subset in it. The suggested model makes use of a 
Quorum system to construct the hopping sequences, so nodes 
are bound to meet with one another.  
   Equally capable to compromise Smart Grid availability are 
Denial of Service attacks occurring at layers higher than the 
physical layer. The common practice against those attacks is 
the deployment of Intrusion Detection Systems (IDS).  
   Intrusion Detection Systems can be classified into three 
broad categories [60]: signature-based, specification-based 
and anomaly-based. A signature-based IDS recognizes 
intrusions using a black-list of known attack patterns. 
Whereas a specification based IDS detects attacks using a set 
of constraints (rules) defining the correct operation of a 
program or protocol. An anomaly-based IDS, finally, 
recognizes deviations from what is considered to be normal, 
by building a model of normal system behavior where any 
deviation from normal is identified as an intrusion. 
   According to the authors of [60], signature based IDSs are 
not suitable for the Smart Grid, due to the fact that they 
cannot be expected to keep up with the ever increasing 
number of new attacks that so often manifest themselves 
within it. On the other hand specification-based and 
anomaly-based IDSs seem to be quite promising for the 
Smart Home/Smart Grid environment. An example for each 
of the two models is presented below. 
   Faisal et.al. in [60],  propose the exploitation of an 
architecture of anomaly-based IDSs as a second line solution 
after firewalls, cryptography and authorization techniques, to 
detect intrusions. Their proposed architecture, involves the 
placement of three IDSs, in smart meters, data concentrators 
and the AMI head-end and is used in combination with 
stream mining techniques to detect anomaly.  Specifically, 
the authors suggest the integration, within or outside each 
smart meter, of an entity namely a ‘security  box’.  This 
security box serves as the IDS within the smart meter. IDSs 
of similar configuration to this one will be installed in the 
data concentrator and the central system. A serial process 
describes the operation of this IDS. The data that arrive in 
the Smart meter, are  inserted  in  the IDS’s acceptor module. 
The acceptor module then forwards them towards a pre-
processing unit responsible to generate new data according 
to some predefined attributes. These new data are then input 
in the stream mining module algorithm whose outcome goes 
through the decision maker unit which decides whether an 
alarm should be triggered or not. 
     As an alternative to this approach, we present the one 
proposed by Berthier et.al. in [61]. In their work, they 
suggest the installation, in key points within the network, of 
sensors characterized by specification-based intrusion 
detection mechanisms suitable for detecting intrusions at the 
application, transport and network layers. The authors detect 
the expected behavior of meters at the network layer based 
on the specification of protocols used by these meters. This 
behavior is then modeled in a simple state diagram 
representing all possible meter states and transitions from 
one to the other. A similar state machine for the application 
layer is presented as well. Each state of these state machines 
defines a different set of rights and functionalities. Any 
operation of the meter that does behave in the expected 
manner and does not abide by the expected set of rules is 
considered suspicious. This work is complemented by a 
proof of correctness and a prototype. 
 
D. Ensuring Authorization 
 
   The last security goal we focus on, is authorization, i.e. the 
attestation that no entity within the Smart Home/Smart Grid 
environment can have access to information or services 
beyond its authority [22]. Despite, its importance for Smart 
Home/Smart Grid security the literature on authorization is 
still limited. Nevertheless, some interesting works have been 
proposed. 
To begin with, we introduce the work of Ruj et. al. in [62]. 
Their work is based on an architecture consisted of HAN, 
BAN and NAN gateways in one side and RTUs on the other. 
Each of the HAN, BAN and NAN gateways in that 
architecture is responsible to create an aggregate of its 
received data, encrypt that aggregate using the Paillier 
encryption scheme and forward it further (HAN to BAN, 
BAN to NAN and NAN to RTU). Access control in Ruj 
et.al. scheme is introduced with the use of an attribute-based 
encryption variant specifically modified by the authors, 
according to the needs of the Smart Grid. In their paradigm, 
the RTU collecting data from different units, encrypts those 
data under a set of attributes before sending them to the data 
repository they should be kept in. These attributes could be 
any information related to that data like the source of energy 
(e.g. solar, wind, fossil fuel), the type of consumer (e.g. 
individual, company, vehicle), the type of equipment (e.g. 
dryer, heater), the time of use (e.g. peak, off-peak) etc. In 
this way, the RTU creates an access policy for the data it 
places into the data repository. Thus, users wanting to have 
access to them should first acquire secret keys, 
corresponding to the attributes of their interest, from a KDC 
(key distribution center). In this way, users can only decrypt 
those data for which they have matching attributes, hence 
access control is achieved. 
    Vaidya et.al. in [63] suggest a somewhat different 
approach for authentication and attribute-based 
authorization, specific to Substation Automation Systems. 
Their approach exploits the idea of public key certificates 
and zero knowledge systems for the purposes of 
authentication and the idea of attribute certificates (ACs) 
for authorization. An attribute certificate can be regarded as 
complimentary to a public key certificate. A public key 
certificate (PKC) is issued by a certification authority (CA) 
and is used to verify the identity of its owner, just like a 
passport. An attribute certificate, on the other hand, is 
issued by an attribute authority (AA) and is used to 
characterize or entitle its holder just like a visa gives a 
person the permission to live/work at a specific place for a 
particular amount of time. Whenever a user requests access 
to an  IED of a substation, both the user and the IED are 
authenticated. Following their authentication the substation 
controller provides the user with his attribute certificate 
(defining his permissions), signed by the controller using an 
elliptic curve algorithm. From that moment on every time a 
user wishes to have access to the IED he sends his signed 
request, his PKC and his AC that will be used for ensuring 
authenticity and authorization.  
    In an alternative approach, Jung et.al. in [64] propose 
their own model for securing access control within the 
Smart Grid. Their model leverages XACML (eXtensible 
Access Control Markup Language) and SAML (Security 
Assertion Markup Language). The XACML standard  
defines a declarative language for describing access policies 
and a processing model describing how to evaluate  requests 
for authorization according to the rules defined in policies. 
XACML can be characterized as an Attribute Based Access 
Control system, where the various attributes associated with 
a user are given as input to the function that determines 
whether a user can access a particular resource in a particular 
way. XACML policies are defined according to a set of 
rules.  The process followed to achieve authorization when 
using XACML could be described as follows: Initially a user 
(called subject in XACML terminology) requests access to 
data / services (called resources) from a particular entity 
within the Smart Grid. The request is routed to an entity 
known as a Policy Enforcement Point (PEP) which uses 
XACML language to create a request based on the attributes 
of the subject, the resource it wants to access and other 
relevant information. Once the request is created, it is 
forwarded to a Policy Decision Point (PDP), which 
communicates with a Policy Store to retrieve any applicable 
policies.  When the potential policies are retrieved, the PDP 
compares the request them and determines whether access 
should be granted or not. 
   Table V provides a summarized view of the approaches 
presented in this section. For each security goal a number of 
promising approaches are listed. Different subnetworks 
within the Smart Home/Smart Grid environment, may 
exploit different combinations of such approaches towards 
the fulfillment of each security goal. Table V, is not 
exhaustive, however it is indicative of the many directions in 
research when it comes to security solutions for such 
complex environments as the Smart Home/Smart Grid.  
 
TABLE V 
REVIEW OF SECURITY COUNTERMEASURES BY GOAL 
 
V. ONGOING ACTIVITIES IN INDUSTRY 
At present, numerous standards, guidelines and 
recommendations underpinning Smart Grid Cyber-Security 
are being developed by international standardisation bodies 
and industry fora. Major economies across the globe strongly 
support the efforts for international standards upon which 
national standards can be built. Their aim is to enhance the 
prospects for international harmonization of Smart Grid 
standards, despite the diversity of infrastructure requirements 
around the world. This section provides a brief overview of 
prominent contributions of both national and international 
standardisation bodies and institutions with respect to Smart 
Grid cyber-security. 
 
A. International level - International Electrotechnical 
Commission (IEC) 
   Being the leading international standardisation 
organisation for the electrical industry, IEC has already 
defined a series of well-focused ICT standards for the 
electrical grid, all based on IEC's Service Oriented 
Architecture for management and automation of energy 
transmission and distribution systems (IEC 62357). Amongst 
these, one can find standards for substation automation (IEC 
61850),  distribution management (IEC 61968), information 
models and APIs for Transmission Network management 
(IEC 61970) and standards for information security for 
power system control operations (IEC 62351 1-8) [65].       
Confidentiality and Privacy  Symmetric/Asymmetric Encryption Algorithms   
(eg. AES/RSA/ECC)  Anonymization  Trusted Aggregators  Homomorphic Encryption  Perturbation Models  Verifiable Computation Models – Zero Knowledge Proof Systems  Data obfuscation 
Integrity  Cryptographic Hashing Techniques (eg. SHA-3)  Digital Watermarking   Adaptive Cumulative Sum Algorithm   Installation of known secure PMUs in network  Load Profiling  Timestamps  Sequence Numbers  Session Keys  Nonces 
Authenticity  Keyed cryptographic hash functions (eg. HMAC)  Physically Unclonable Functions  Hash based authentication codes  MAC-attached and HORS-signed messages 
Non Repudiation  Mutual Inspection with Smart Meters  Unique keys for customer-AMI communication   AMI transaction logging 
Availability  Alternate Frequency Channels according to hardcoded sequence  Frequency Quorum Rendezvous  Anomaly Based IDSs  Specification Based IDSs 
Authorization  Attribute Based Encryption  Attribute Certificates  Attribute Based Access Control System based on XACML 
   For the purposes of promoting the development of Smart 
Grids, IEC created the Smart Grid Strategy Working Group 
(IEC SG3) in 2008. IEC SG3, works in collaboration with 
many ongoing Smart Grid projects and is responsible for the 
research and creation of standards regarding different aspects 
of Smart Grids. The five standards we mentioned above, 
were identified as the core standards of the Smart Grid 
standards-system by IEC SG3 [66]. These standards seem to 
be gaining wide acceptance across the globe, leading us to 
believe that despite regional differences in subjects like 
Metering, Smart Homes and Buildings, Demand Response 
plans, EVs and the security and privacy thereof, the world is 
more or less reaching a consensus on subjects like Smart 
Grid Architecture, Communication and Communication 
Security, Common Data Models and Distributed Energy 
Resources manipulation [67].  
  
B.  US - Smart Grid Interoperability Panel (SGIP) 
  Established by the U.S National Institute of Standards 
(NIST) in 2009, the Smart Grid Interoperability Panel is a 
public-private partnership aiming to facilitate the 
participation of electricity industry stakeholders from 22 
industry segments in the Smart Grid standardisation efforts 
lead by NIST. The primary contributions of the SGIP in the 
development of standards, are in the area of identifying 
certification requirements, reviewing use cases, actively 
educating Smart Grid industry stakeholders on 
interoperability, overseeing standardisation efforts but also 
conducting serious efforts for the global interoperability 
alignment[68].  
  SGIP is organized in several committees, working groups 
and task forces. Of specific interest to us, is the Cyber 
Security Working Group (CSWG), whose goal is to develop 
an overall cyber security strategy for the Smart Grid [65]. In 
September 2010, SGIP-CSWG published a three volume 
report known as "Guidelines for Smart Grid Cyber Security". 
Volume one, focuses on the description of the high level 
architecture of the Smart Grid, the categorisation of different 
interfaces and the identification of cyber security 
requirements for these interface categories. Volume two,  
focuses on customer privacy issues.  Volume three,  provides 
additional material regarding vulnerabilities within the Smart 
Grid. At the moment of writing this paper, NIST is seeking 
public comments for its first revision of the above-mentioned 
guidelines, with the 24
th
 of December 2013 being the last 
date for comment submission [69].  
 
C.  European Union –Smart Grid Coordination Group   
(SG-CG) 
  The European Smart Grid Coordination Group was formed 
by CEN-CENELEC and ETSI in response to the EU 
Commission mandate M/490, in order to provide a 
comprehensive framework on Smart Grids. As part of this 
framework several reports were released by the end of 2012. 
Of particular interest to us, are those reports on or relevant to 
Smart Grid Cyber Security. Such reports are presented 
below.  The "First Set of Standards" report [70] provides a 
list of consistent standards regarding information 
exchange within the Smart Grid, including an 
overview of current cyber-security standards like 
IEC’s 62351 parts 1 to 8, IEC 61850-90-5, several 
IETF RFCs and several ETSI standards.   The "Smart Grid Reference Architecture" report 
[71] defines a three dimensional reference 
architecture of the Smart Grid upon which the 
analysis of information security use cases identified 
by the Smart Grid Information Security Working 
Group of the SG-CG, is based.   The "Sustainable Processes" report [72] creates a 
list of use cases describing the functionality of the 
Smart Grid. These use cases are used by the Smart 
Grid Information Security Working Group for the 
purposes of risk and threat analysis but also for the 
assessment of proposed methods for ensuring Cyber 
Security within the Smart Grid.   Finally, the "Smart Grid Information Security" 
report [58], provides a high level guidance on how 
different standards apply to Smart Grid information 
security, data protection and privacy by defining 
five security levels aiming to bridge electrical grid 
operations and information security, and two data 
protection levels for the classification of 
information. 
 
D.  China 
For the purposes of efficiently setting up the national Smart 
Grid standards-system a steering group of members of the 
China Electricity Council (CEC), Standardisation 
Administration China (SAC), Energy Bureau and State Grid 
Corporation China (the largest state-owned electric utility in 
the world) was established in 2010. By the end of that year, 
two important reports : the "Smart Grid technical standard 
plan" and "Smart Grid key equipment R&D plan" were 
formally released, however these reports are not available to 
the public [65]. What is publicly available, is the 
"Framework and Roadmap for Strong & Smart Grid 
Standards" report, released in 2010 by State Grid 
Corporation. Within this report a list of core standards is 
presented, and a standards gap analysis is performed. The list 
of standards, also known as First Batch of SGCC Smart Grid 
Standards [66], strongly refers to international standards 
(especially IEC standards such as those we have already 
mentioned, including IEC 62351 for security), but also 
includes national standards and guidelines defined by the 
corporation itself. China's heavy interest on Smart Grid 
cyber security, is expected to reflect on its cyber security 
market which is estimated to reach USD 50 billion by 2020 
[74].      
 
E.  Japan 
In order to promote the development of Smart Grid 
standardisation, the Ministry of Economy, Trade and 
Industry in Japan, formed a strategic working group, the 
Smart Grid Standardisation Study Group, in August 2009. 
By January 2010, this group issued a report outlining its 
principal initiatives. These initiatives included among others 
the implementation of IEC's roadmap of standards (including 
cyber-security standards), close collaboration with NIST, 
CENELEC and other standardisation bodies and promotion 
of related policy studies [66]. Japan, also commissioned four 
large scale pilot projects - Kyoto Keihanna district, 
Yokohoma city, Toyota city and Kitakyushu city - to study 
different aspects of the Smart Grid. 
 
F.  Australia 
In June 2011, the Australian Department of Resources, 
Energy and Tourism commissioned Standards Australia and 
Rare Consulting to identify deficiencies in the Australian set 
of Smart Grid standards. This effort resulted in the 
“Australian Smart Grid Standards RoadMap” [75] published 
in June 2012. Within this Standards RoadMap a collection of 
foundation (national and international) standards can be 
found. Of specific interest to us are those regarding Smart 
Grid Cyber Security. For Smart Grid Cyber Security, 
Standards Australia, suggested the adaptation of existing 
international standards such as IEC/TS 62351 parts 1-8, 
ISO/IEC 27001, ANSI/ISA-99 and ITU-T in a way that best 
meets the requirements of the Australian electricity industry. 
The report suggests NIST's completed work as a good 
primary source for security guidelines while underlying the 
importance of conformity of potential cyber security 
standards with the Australian Privacy legislation. 
 
VI. FURTHER CHALLENGES AND FUTURE DIRECTIONS  
   Thus far, we have identified illustrative scenarios of 
interaction amongst entities of the Smart Home and the 
Smart Grid. We have analyzed potential cyber and physical 
security threats, studied them in terms of the security goals 
they violate and evaluated their impact on the grid. Likewise, 
we have also reviewed the existing literature suggesting 
promising solutions and proposing countermeasures to help 
us achieve the security goals we set for our system.  
   To complete our overview of Smart Home/Smart Grid 
security, open challenges and directions for future research 
are described below and are summarized in Table VI.  
  Establishing a universal standardisation framework 
for secure communication within the Smart Home 
and the Smart Grid. 
As we have mentioned in section II, the Smart Grid is a 
complex, heterogeneous network of networks whose success 
largely depends on the continuous communication of its 
entities. With each sub network in the Smart Grid, having its 
own equipment, its own requirements and its own 
capabilities, ensuring the interoperable and uninterrupted 
communication between Smart Grid entities becomes a 
rather intimidating task. Hence, a universal standardization 
framework developing guidelines and including protocols 
and model standards for the secure communication between 
the entities belonging to different sub networks within the 
Smart Grid/Smart Home environment, is considered 
essential. In establishing this universal standardization 
framework, Smart Home/Smart Grid communicating entities 
should be regarded both as stand-alone but also as part of the 
entire Grid. Such an approach could contribute to the 
successful meeting of the unique requirements posed by 
specific Smart Grid subsystems.  
   Establishing authorities to evaluate the 
conformance of Smart Home/Smart Grid industry to 
the different voluntary standards. 
Most standards created for the Smart Grid, are voluntary, i.e. 
they have not been mandated by governments or business 
contracts. However, this cannot justify the lack of a 
coordinated approach for monitoring the extend at which the 
industry has adopted those standards. Having authorities 
responsible to evaluate the level of conformance of the 
industry to those voluntary standards could prove to be 
particularly valuable in helping regulators decide if a 
standard is effective or if any changes are needed for its 
improvement. 
 
  Establishing new/altering old protocols with respect 
to the Smart Grids unique requirements. 
The stringent requirements of some of the Smart Grids sub 
networks are part of the reason why the Smart Grid demands 
the redesigning of existing protocols, or the creation of new 
ones. Smart Home/Smart Grid standards, should be 
characterized by the flexibility needed for successfully 
meeting  their  functional  requirements.  Let’s  consider 
IEC61850 standard for substation communication. This 
standard, in order to be able to ensure that critical messages 
for a substation (such as an islanding command for fault 
isolation) will not experience delays of more than 3ms, thus 
putting the entire substation equipment at risk, defines three 
deferent protocol stacks (TCP/IP , UDP/IP and Application 
to MAC layer). In fact, any protocol used in the Smart Grid,  
for authentication, secure communication, data aggregation 
or even routing of data, should be designed to meet the 
Smart Grid’s unique requirements. 
  Establishing new metrics for the evaluation of the 
cyber security mechanisms and solutions suggested. 
In order for Smart Grid authorities to be able to evaluate the 
extent to which a proposed security mechanism meets the 
security goals set, well defined metrics have to be agreed 
upon by the electricity industry. Such a development will 
enable authorities to compare amongst suggested solutions 
on a common basis, thus making the best decisions when it 
comes to which mechanisms or solutions should be 
standardized, or used in combination to one another. Such 
metrics could also allow for a better evaluation of the 
expected outcomes of an investment on a particular security 
mechanism. 
  Evaluating the security implications arising from 
the introduction of PHEVs/PEVs and Distributed 
Energy Resources as part of the Smart Grid and the 
Smart Home. 
As our grid becomes smarter, new entities are expected to be 
incorporated in it. Plug in electric vehicles (hybrid or not) 
and distributed energy resources (in Smart Homes or as part 
of the Smart Grid) are two categories of entities of particular 
interest that have received very limited attention up to now 
[64]. We believe that additional  research studies should be 
carried out on the security implications raised by their 
incorporation.  Furthermore, new  methods of guaranteeing 
their operation could be closely observed so that any 
abnormalities will be detected and addressed before they 
become large-scale problems. 
 Establishing a legal framework specific to Smart 
Grid privacy. 
For the purposes of ensuring privacy within the Smart Grid, 
a legal framework specific to privacy in the Smart Grid has 
to be implemented. Such a framework is expected to define 
accurately: how sensitive data should be collected; who is 
supposed to collect them; for how long and where can they 
be stored; under what circumstances is the owner expected to 
provide his consent before his data can be disclosed etc….   
  Establishing new aggregation schemes that do not 
involve a trusted aggregator. 
Relative to the above challenge, another challenge that has to 
do with privacy is establishing new schemes for aggregating 
data without involving a trusted aggregator. Such schemes 
are expected be able to produce a summary of a given input, 
without being able to understand that input and without 
introducing further delays in the entire process that could 
actually threaten the grid’s stability. 
  Establishing new techniques for facing jamming 
attacks. 
As our literature review revealed, spread spectrum 
techniques are prominent when it comes to facing jamming 
attacks against resource availability. Despite their 
effectiveness however these techniques introduce an 
overhead in the network which could potentially affect the 
timely delivery of critical messages in the Smart Grid, 
resulting in instabilities. We thus need new systems securing 
us from jamming attacks without burdening the network with 
extra overhead. 
  Establishing Intrusion Detection, Intrusion 
Prevention and Intrusion Recovery Systems 
specifically for the Smart Grid. 
Denial of Service Attacks and Distributed Denial of Service 
Attacks are amongst the most dangerous attacks against the 
Smart  Grid.  If  such  attacks,  threatening  the  Smart  Grid’s 
availability, are not detected and quarantined early enough, 
we could risk losing the functionality of our most critical 
infrastructure. Early detection and prevention of attacks, 
specifically tailored for the Smart Grid, is therefore another 
challenge. New methods for risk assessment not based on 
prior knowledge and not introducing further delays into the 
overall system operation are exactly what we need. Also, in 
the case an attack is not detected and prevented, appropriate 
Intrusion Recovery techniques must be in place to ensure 
graceful degradation.  
  Designing systems that can support the logging of 
information for the purposes of audit controls and 
forensics analysis. 
For the Smart Home/Smart Grid environment, to ensure 
accountability and non-repudiation, it is imperative that it 
has the ability to provide undeniable evidence proving the 
existence and details of any transaction. Such information 
should be kept in logs situated all across the Smart Grid. The 
data collected in such logs is to be used for the purposes of 
forensic analysis as well as for resolving legal disputes. 
Every modification on this data has to be carried out by an 
authenticated entity and it will be logged into the system. 
Special care should be given in the designing process, so as 
to avoid the introduction of too much overhead into this 
logging process. 
  Establish more key management techniques 
specifically for the AMI and the Wide Area 
Measurements Network.  
   As AMI, we define the architecture that enables two way 
communication between the Smart Meters and the utility. 
The AMI enables the utility to receive near-real time 
information regarding the energy consumption of premises; 
and the consumer to receive near-real time pricing signals 
and feedback regarding his energy consumption. The 
messages sent by the utility to Smart meters are critical since 
they define how the operation of appliances within premises 
is scheduled. The messages sent by the Smart meter to the 
utility are also considered to be critical, since they are used 
by the utility for demand prediction and demand-supply 
management.  
  Critical messages are also exchanged within another type of 
network in the Smart Grid, the Wide Area Measurement 
Network. Such a network consists of many sub-networks 
equipped with advanced metering technology (such as 
PMUs). Their purpose is to enhance the operator’s real-time 
situational  awareness  through  regular  reports  of  the  grid’s 
current state. The measurements collected from different 
phasor-measurement sites reveal abnormalities and trigger 
immediate action to protect the grid’s equipment in cases of 
emergency thus maintaining their integrity is of primary 
importance for the overall functioning of the grid. 
    Despite the significance of these messages however, to 
date, the majority of key management schemes proposed for 
securing communications within the Smart Grid, address the 
establishment of keys for the communicating entities within 
the SCADA systems only. In fact, few research studies have 
been carried out on key management schemes for the AMI 
entities and the Wide Area Measurement Network entities. 
For this reason, we believe additional research should be 
focused on the creation of key establishment schemes 
specifically designed for the AMI and the Wide Area 
Measurement Networks. 
 
          TABLE VI 
FUTURE CHALLENGES AND OPEN DIRECTIONS 
 
CHALLENGES OF REGULATORY NATURE 
  Standardisation framework for secure communication within the 
SH/SG environment.  Authorities and criteria to evaluate conformance to standards.  New metrics for evaluation of cyber-security mechanisms  Adaptation of old/Creation of new protocols to meet SG 
constraints and requirements.  Legal Framework on SG privacy. 
 
TECHNICAL CHALLENGES 
  Evaluation of security implications of PEV/DER integration 
within SH/SG.  New aggregation schemes without trusted aggregators.  New techniques against jamming attacks with less overhead than 
spread spectrum.  New IDSs specifically for SH/SG environments.  Support of logging functionality for user-involving transactions.  New key management schemes for AMI and WAMS. 
 
 
VII. CONCLUDING REMARKS 
   Sooner than later, the traditional grids of today will evolve 
into the electrical grids of tomorrow. An evolution, that 
holds the promise of a robust, effective and efficient energy 
infrastructure for the future, is known as the Smart Grid. 
Little  by  little  every  entity  within  today’s  grid,  even  our 
home, will undergo its own transformation towards the 
smartening of our electrical grid with the benefits of this 
evolution being indisputable for both the utilities and the 
consumers. As an indispensable part of this evolution, we 
recognize the transformation of our homes into the Energy 
Aware Smart Homes of the future. Homes, that will be in 
constant interaction with the utilities in an effort for better 
energy management. Of vital importance, during this 
redesigning of our homes and grid, is ensuring security and 
privacy. A task that becomes more intimidating, as new 
technologies get incorporated into these already complex 
infrastructures.  
   In this paper we presented dangers looming under some of 
the most illustrative scenarios of interaction amongst entities 
of the Smart Home/Smart Grid environments, evaluating 
their impact on the entire grid. In addition to that, we 
conducted a review of recent literature on potential solutions 
and countermeasures, aiming to identify approaches for 
prevention or defense against attacks that could help us 
achieve the security objectives we set for both the Smart 
Home and the Smart Grid. Smart Grid cyber security 
standardisation efforts across the globe were also outlined, 
whereas a section devoted to open challenges and future 
directions for research served as the conclusion of our paper. 
Through that section, we suggested several topics that need 
to be further investigated.  
   The heterogeneity of the Smart Home/Smart Grid 
environment  does  not  leave  room  for  “one-size-fits-all” 
security solutions making Smart Home/Smart Grid security a 
challenging yet promising research field for the future. 
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